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1 Introduction
An important feature of the current economic conditions in the EU, which challenges
the design and implementation of macroeconomic policy, is inflation uncertainty.
With monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB henceforth), in-
flation in the euro area has remained below the ECB’s medium-run objective for
some time. While some recent studies have looked at the impact of the ZLB on
fiscal policy, research on the differential impact of inflation on different budgetary
items is limited. In this context, the aim of this paper is to examine the effects
of alternative fiscal consolidation strategies to reduce the public wage bill, specifi-
cally comparing price-based measures and quantity-based measures, under different
inflation environments.
As seen in Figure 1, since 2012, the inflation rate across the euro area has been
trending downwards and still remains below the ECB’s 2% target. At the same time,
the scope for monetary policy easing has been limited, with nominal interest rates
at the ZLB, and the effects of unconventional measures, such as the recent asset
purchases, remaining uncertain.
This environment has important implications for fiscal policy. Firstly, low in-
flation is generally considered to make fiscal consolidation more difficult. Indeed,
historically, periods of high inflation have been used to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios,
for example in many western countries following both the First and Second World
War (see Reinhart et al. 2015). From a theoretical point of view, low inflation re-
duces the growth in nominal GDP and, all else equal, raises deficit- and debt-to-GDP
ratios. Debt dynamics would be left unchanged if nominal interest rates fall by the
same magnitude as inflation, thus leaving real rates unchanged. Instead, when nom-
inal rates have hit the ZLB, falling inflation leads to rising real interest rates, making
it more difficult to reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Moreover, much of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, has found that
2
Figure 1: Inflation and Interest Rates in the Euro Area Source: ECB, Eurostat
fiscal multipliers are higher when monetary policy is constrained. In particular,
Eggertsson (2011) found that the government spending multiplier goes from below
0.5, to around 2.3 at the ZLB, and that tax multipliers even change sign and become
negative at the ZLB. Similar results are found in the studies of Christiano et al.
(2011), Coenen et al. (2012) and De Long and Summers (2012). Empirically, Ilzetzki
et al. (2013) corroborate these results, finding that government spending multipliers
are substantially higher in countries operating under fixed exchange rates, which
is another form of constrained monetary policy. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014)
draw similar conclusions regarding the multiplier of military spending, although their
analysis is not a direct comparison of different monetary regimes. Based on these
principles, several papers discuss the potential role of fiscal stimulus in alleviating a
ZLB crisis: Correia et al. (2013) suggest an alternative stimulus strategy to the use of
government spending, based on consumption taxation, and Rendahl (2015) focuses on
amplification effects in the labour market due to the ZLB and how expansionary fiscal
policy can best exploit these. The converse of these arguments is that attempting
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to carry out fiscal consolidation in a liquidity trap can be very costly, and even
self-defeating.
Another important way in which low inflation affects fiscal policy is the fact that
inflation shocks can be expected to have a different impact, both in terms of size
and timing, across different government revenue and expenditure categories. In line
with the research highlighted above, Jalil (2012) finds that the differences between
the estimated multipliers of government spending and taxation can be explained
by the differential response of monetary policy. Erceg and Linde (2013) find that
the magnitude of the output contraction induced by spending-based consolidation
is roughly three times larger when monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB than
when it is unconstrained. They also find that, at the ZLB, a tax-based consolidation
is less costly in the short-run than a spending-based consolidation, while the opposite
is true when monetary policy is unconstrained. McManus et al. (2014) find that the
ZLB has different effects on different fiscal consolidation instruments, and should
therefore be considered when designing austerity packages.
One dimension of this comparison which has been overlooked is that the effec-
tiveness of consolidation packages that focus on quantity-based measures instead
of price-based measures may be different depending on the inflation environment.
In that context, reducing the wage bill via cutting wages (price-based measure)
or reducing public employees (quantity-based measure) may have a different bud-
getary impact depending on the inflation environment. This paper aims to uncover
the potential effect of a low-inflation environment on these alternative consolidation
strategies, with a particular focus on the public wage bill.
Recent austerity packages implemented in many European countries, like Greece
and Spain, have placed special emphasis on the reduction of the public wage bill.
According to data reported by Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010), shown in Figure 2, the
government wage bill before the crisis accounted, on average, for almost a quarter
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Figure 2: Public Wage Bill and Public Employment Before the Crisis Source: Holm-
Hadulla et al. (2010)
of total public spending and more than 10% of GDP in the euro area. On average,
almost 15% of the labour force in the euro area was employed by the public sector.
Since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, most of these countries have been trying to
cut government wage bills, by freezing wages and hirings, and cutting or retrenching
specific indemnities or benefits. A recent report by Gama et al. (2015) shows that
even countries that showed more resilience in the aftermath of the crisis, such as
the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, saw steep declines in
public administration employment (see Figure 3). Cuts in public sector wages have
been widely implemented in countries like Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal (see Figure 4).
In this paper, we develop a DSGE model through which we can study the differen-
tial effects of quantity-based and price-based consolidation measures. In particular,
we consider a New-Keynesian model of a two-block monetary union, with nominal
rigidities in the form of monopolistic retailers facing price-stickiness. In order to build
a complete model of the labour market, we incorporate both search and matching
frictions, leading to involuntary unemployment, and an endogenous labour force par-
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Figure 3: Changes in Public Sector Employment Following the Crisis Source: Gama
et al. (2015)
Figure 4: Changes in Public Sector Wages Following the Crisis Source: Eurostat
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ticipation decision, leading to voluntary unemployment. Finally, to study the effects
of the public wage bill, we allow the government to hire public employees to produce
a public good that is used by private firms.
Following Erceg and Linde (2013) and Pappa et al. (2015), fiscal policy responds
to the deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio from a target value, and fiscal consolidation
occurs when this target is hit by a negative shock. We focus attention on two fiscal
consolidation instruments on the part of the government: public wage cuts and public
vacancy cuts. We consider each instrument separately, assuming that if one is active,
the other remains fixed at its steady state value. We then repeat this experiment
when the economy faces low inflation due to a liquidity trap. This setup allows us to
compare, for a given consolidation volume, the effects of the alternative consolidation
strategies in different environments.
There has been little work so far in explicitly modeling the interaction between
the private and the public sector. The existing literature has largely focused on eval-
uating the impact of the public sector on the level or volatility of employment and
wages (see e.g. Algan et al. (2002), Quadrini and Trigari 2007, Ho¨rner et al. 2007,
and Gomes 2015b). Ardagna (2007) has shown using a DSGE model with a union-
ized labour market (but without unemployment) that, in response to a debt-financed
increase in public-sector employment and wages, unions demand higher wages, which
leads to a fall in private-sector employment and capital stock, and a contraction in
the economy. Michaillat (2014) makes an important contribution by finding that the
“government multiplier”, defined as the additional number of workers hired in the
private sector when one public job is created, is positive and countercyclical, sug-
gesting that the public sector tends to stabilize labour market fluctuations. Bradley
et al. (2015) are the first to estimate (using British data) a model with equilibrium
unemployment and a public sector. The authors also run simulations that attempt
to mimic austerity measures implemented across Europe after the 2008 recession,
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namely a reduction in public sector hiring, an increase in public sector layoffs, and
progressive and proportional cuts to the distribution of wages in the public sector.
They find that all four policies increase hiring and turnover in the private sector, re-
duce public sector employment which is largely compensated by an increase in private
sector employment, summing up to very moderate changes in aggregate unemploy-
ment; and finally, exert a very small impact on mean wages and in the aggregate
economy. In an earlier contribution, Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) developed a
simple two-sector model of the labour market with endogenous unemployment, but
without explicit dynamics, showing that increases in government wages lead through
worker flow dynamics to increases in private sector wages and, therefore, directly
to higher unemployment. Increases in government employment do not have a sig-
nificant impact on unemployment, and might even raise it. Using data for Greece,
they found strong support for their theoretical predictions. On the empirical front,
Cavallo (2005) found for the US that hours, output, and investment in the private
sector decrease in response to an unanticipated increase in the government wage bill
expenditure, in line with Finn (1998), but without distinguishing between public
wage and employment policies.
In our model, in normal times, a fiscal consolidation through a cut in public wages
is able to reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio faster than public vacancy costs,
although both have similar positive effects on private output through an increase
in private-sector hirings. In the case of public wage cuts the increase in private-
sector employment dominates the fall in public employment, leading to a fall in
the unemployment rate, while in the case of public vacancy cuts the unemployment
rate rises. Hence, public wage cuts are a preferable consolidation strategy to public
vacancy cuts in normal times.
In a low inflation environment, induced by a negative demand shock, the fall
in demand leads to a fall in private output, which, along with the rise in the real
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interest rate, causes government debt-to-GDP to rise. Hence a much larger cut in
the public wage bill is required to bring debt to the desired level, meaning that
the consolidation in this environment has large negative effects. The differences
between the two instruments appear less pronounced in a low inflation environment;
yet, again, public wage cuts lead to a reduction in the long-run unemployment rate,
while public vacancy cuts induce a persistent rise in unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organised follows. In Section 2, we provide the
details of the model. Section 3 discusses the results of the different policy experiments
and extensive sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a two-country DSGE model of a monetary union with search and match-
ing frictions, endogenous labour force participation, and sticky prices in the short
run. The two countries, labeled Home and Foreign, are of sizes n and 1− n, respec-
tively. The following subsections describe the Home economy in more detail: the
structure of the Foreign economy is analogous. All variables are in per capita terms.
Where necessary, the conventional ? denotes foreign variables or parameters, and the
subscripts h and f denotes goods produced in the Home and Foreign country and
their respective prices.
There are four types of firms in each country: (i) a public firm that produces
a good used in private production, (ii) private competitive firms that use labour,
capital and the public good to produce a non-tradable intermediate good, (iii) mo-
nopolistic retailers that transform the intermediate good into a tradeable good, and
(iv) competitive final goods producers that use domestic and foreign produced re-
tail goods to produce a final, non-tradeable good which is used for investment and
consumption. Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while labour market frictions
occur in the intermediate goods sector. The representative household consists of
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private and public employees, unemployed, and labour force non-participants. The
government collects taxes and uses revenues to finance the wages of public employ-
ees, the costs of opening new vacancies in the public sector and the provision of
unemployment benefits.
2.1 Labour markets
We consider search and matching frictions in both the private and public labour mar-
kets. In each period, jobs in each sector, j = p, g, are destroyed at a constant fraction
σj and a measure mj of new matches are formed. The evolution of employment in
each sector is thus given by:
njt+1 = (1− σj)njt +mjt (1)
We assume that σp > σg in order to capture the fact that, in general, public employ-
ment is more permanent than private employment.
The new matches are given by:
mjt = ρ
j
m(υ
j
t )
α(ujt)
1−α (2)
where the matching efficiency, ρjm, can differ in the two sectors. From the match-
ing functions specified above we can define, for each sector j, the probability of a
jobseeker being hired, ψhjt , and of a vacancy being filled, ψ
fj
t :
ψhjt ≡
mjt
ujt
(3)
ψfjt ≡
mjt
υjt
(4)
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2.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. The
members of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the frac-
tion of members that are out of the labour force, lt, and a consumption bundle, ct.
Following Neiss and Pappa (2005), we also allow for variable labour effort, xt, which
leads to separable disutility. The instantaneous utility function is thus given by:
U(ct, lt, xt) =
c1−ηt
1− η + Φ
l1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
−Υ x
1+ξ
t
1 + ξ
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Φ > 0 is the
relative preference for leisure, ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply,
and Υ > 0 andξ are the utility parameters for variable labour effort.
At any point in time, a fraction npt (n
g
t ) of the household members are private
(public) employees. Campolmi and Gnocchi (2014) and Bruckner and Pappa (2012)
have added a labour force participation choice in New Keynesian models of equilib-
rium unemployment. Following Ravn (2008), the participation choice is modelled as
a trade-off between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of finding a job. In
particular, the household chooses the fraction of the unemployed actively searching
for a job, ut, and the fraction which are out of the labour force and enjoying leisure,
lt, so that:
npt + n
g
t + ut + lt = 1 (5)
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in each sector: a share st
of jobseekers look for a job in the public sector, while the remainder, (1 − st), seek
employment in the private sector. That is, ugt ≡ stut and upt ≡ (1− st)ut.1
1For simplicity, we will abstract from variable labour effort in the public sector.
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The household owns the private capital stock, which evolves according to:
kpt+1 =
[
1− ω
2
(
ipt
ipt−1
− 1
)2]
ipt + (1− δp) kpt (6)
where ipt is private investment, δ
p is a constant depreciation rate and ω dictates the
size of investment adjustment costs.
The budget constraint, in real terms, is given by
(1 + τc) ct + i
p
t + bg,t+1 + etrf,t−1bf,t ≤ [rpt − τk (rpt − δp)] kpt + rt−1bg,t + etbf,t+1(7)
+ (1− τn) (wptnptxt + wgtngt ) + but + Πpt + Tt
where wjt are the real wages in the two sectors, r
p
t is the real return on capital, b
denotes unemployment benefits, Πpt are the profits of the monopolistic retailers, dis-
cussed below, and τc, τk, τn, and Tt represent taxes on private consumption, private
capital, labour income and lump-sum transfers, respectively. bg,t are government
bonds which pay the real return rt−1, whereas bf,t denote liabilities with the Foreign
country. Although the nominal exchange rate in fixed, the interest rate on foreign
assets, rf,t, is still affected by consumer inflation differentials between the two coun-
tries, which are captured by the real exchange rate, et. In fact, we can define the
nominal interest rate at Home, Rt, through Fisher equation
rt =
Rt
pit+1
(8)
where pit is the gross consumer inflation rate.
Thus the problem of the household is to choosect, ut, st, n
p
t+1, n
g
t+1, xt, i
p
t , k
p
t+1,
bg,t+1, bf,t+1 to maximise lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint, (7), the
law of motion of employment in each sector, (1), the law of motion of capital, (6),
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and the composition of the household, (5). The resulting first order conditions are
provided in an online appendix. For use below, we define the marginal value of an
additional private sector employee as:
V Hnpt = λctw
p
t xt(1− τn)− Φlϕt + (1− σp)λnpt (9)
= λctw
p
t xt(1− τn)− Φlϕt + (1− σp)βEt(V Hnpt+1)
where λct and λnpt are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint and the
law of motion of private employment respectively.
2.3 Production
2.3.1 Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
ypt = (Atn
p
txt)
1−φ(kpt )
φ(ygt )
ν (10)
where At is a labour augmenting productivity factor, k
p
t and n
p
t are private capital
and labour inputs, xt is the effort intensity of labour. Following Barro (1990) and
Turnovsky (1999), we allow the public good, ygt , to enter the private production
function, taken as exogenous by the firms. The parameter ν regulates how the
public input affects private production: when ν is zero, the government good is
unproductive.
Since current hires give future value to intermediate firms, the optimization prob-
lem is dynamic and hence firms maximize the discounted value of future profits. The
number of workers currently employed, npt , is taken as given and the employment
decision concerns the number of vacancies posted in the current period, υpt , so as
13
to employ the desired number of workers next period, npt+1.
2 Firms also decide
the amount of the private capital, kpt , to be rented from the household at rate r
p
t .
The problem of an intermediate firm with npt currently employed workers consists of
choosing kpt and υ
p
t to maximize:
Qp(npt ) = max
kpt ,υ
p
t
{
px,t(Atxtn
p
t )
1−φ(kpt )
φ(ygt )
ν − wptnptxt − rpt kpt − κυpt + Et
[
Λt,t+1Q
p(npt+1)
]}
(11)
where px,t is the relative price of intermediate goods, κ is a utility cost associated with
posting a new vacancy, and Λt,t+1 = β
λct+1
λct
is the discount factor. The maximization
takes place subject to the private employment transition equation, where the firm
takes the probability of the vacancy being filled as given:
npt+1 = (1− σp)npt + ψfpt υpt (12)
The first-order conditions are:
px,tφ
ypt
kpt
= rpt (13)
κ
ψfpt
= EtΛt,t+1[px,t+1(1− φ) y
p
t+1
npt+1
− wpt+1xt+1 + (1− σp)
κ
ψfpt+1
] (14)
According to (13) and (14) the value of the marginal product of private capital should
equal the real rental rate and the marginal cost of opening a vacancy should equal the
expected marginal benefit. The latter includes the marginal productivity of labour
minus the wage plus the continuation value, knowing that with probability σp the
match can be destroyed.
2Firms adjust employment by varying the number of workers (extensive margin) rather than the
number of hours per worker. According to Hansen (1985), most of the employment fluctuations
arise from movements in this margin.
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The expected value of the marginal job for the intermediate firm, V Fnpt is:
V Fnpt ≡
∂Qp(npt )
∂npt
= px,t(1− φ)y
p
t
npt
− wpt xt +
(1− σp)κ
ψfpt
(15)
2.3.2 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the
unit interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods and differentiate them with a technol-
ogy that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and
thus the relative price of intermediate goods, px,t, coincides with the real marginal
cost faced by the retailers. Let yit be the quantity of output sold by retailer i. The
final consumption good can be expressed as:
yrt =
[ˆ 1
0
(yit)
−1
 di
] 
−1
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for each variety of retail goods.
The final good is sold at a price Ph,t =
(´
(Pi,h,t)
−1 di
) 1
−1 . The demand for each
intermediate good depends on its relative price and on aggregate demand
yi,t =
(
Pi,h,t
Ph,t
)−
yrt (16)
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset
its price with a fixed probability (1− χ). Firms that are able to reset their price
choose P ∗i,h,t so as to maximize expected real profits given by
Πt (i) = MaxP ∗i,h,tEt
∞∑
s=0
(βχ)s Λt,t+s
([
Pi,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
]
yi,t+s
)
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subject to the demand schedule (16), in each period. Since all firms are ex-ante
identical, P ∗i,h,t = P
∗
h,t for all i. The resulting expression for p
∗
h,t ≡ P ∗h,t/Pt is
p∗h,t
ph,t
=

(− 1)
Nt
Dt (17)
where
Nt = px,tyrt + βχΛt,t+1 (pih,t+1)Nt+1 (18)
Dt = ph,tyrt + βχΛt,t+1 (pih,t+1)−1Dt+1 (19)
ph,t ≡ Ph,t/Pt is the real domestic price of yrt and pih,tdenotes producer inflation.
Under the assumption of Calvo pricing, the price index, in nominal terms, is given
by
Ph,t = χ (Ph,t−1)
−1 + (1− χ) (P ∗h,t)1− (20)
Retail goods are sold domestically and abroad. In aggregate,
yrt = yh,t + y
?
h,t (21)
where yh,t is the share of retail goods sold domestically and y
?
h,t the quantity sold
abroad, and we have assumed the law of one price holds
ph,t = etp
?
h,t (22)
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2.3.3 Final Goods Producer
Finally, in each country perfectly competitive firms produce a non-tradeable final
good by aggregating domestic and foreign aggregate retail goods using technology
yt =
[
($)
1
γ (yh,t)
γ−1
γ + (1−$) 1γ (τyf,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
where τ ≡ (1− n) /n normalizes the amount of imported goods at Home to per
capita terms. The home-bias parameter $ denotes the fraction of goods produced at
home that are used in the production of the final good. The elasticity of substitution
between home-produced and imported goods is given by γ. Final good producers
maximize profits yt− ph,tyh,t− pf,tτyf,t each period. Solving for the optimal demand
functions gives
yh,t = $ (ph,t)
−γ yt (23)
yf,t = (1−$) (pf,t)−γ n
1− nyt (24)
The consumer price index, Pt, is defined by substituting out yh,t and yf,t in the
CES above by the respective demand curves, which yields
Pt = $ (Ph,t)
1−γ + (1−$) (Pf,t)1−γ (25)
2.4 Government
The government sector produces the public good using public capital and labour:
ygt = (Atn
g
t )
1−µ(k¯g)µ (26)
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where we assume that productivity shocks are not sector specific and µ is the share
of public capital, k¯g, which is assumed fixed. The public good, which is provided for
free, provides productivity and utility enhancing services. Government expenditure
consists of public wages, public vacancy costs and unemployment benefits, while
revenues come from the consumption, capital income, labour income and lump-sum
taxes. The government deficit is therefore defined by:
DFt = w
g
tn
g
t + κv
g
t + but − TRt
where TRt ≡ τn(wptnptxt + wgtngt ) + τk(rpt − δp)kpt + T + τcct denotes tax revenues.
The government budget constraint is given by:
bg,t +DFt =
bg,t+1
rt
(27)
We assume that tax rates are constant and fixed at their steady state levels, and
we do not consider them as active instruments for fiscal consolidation. Similarly we
assume that government investment is held fixed at it’s steady state value, ig = δgkg,
keeping the public capital stock constant. Thus the government has two potential
fiscal instruments, vg and wg. We consider each instrument separately, assuming that
if one is active, the other remains fixed at its steady state value. For Ψ ∈ {vg,wg},
we assume fiscal rules of the form, following Erceg and Linde (2013) and Pappa et
al. (2015):
Ψt = Ψ
(1−βΨ0) ΨβΨ0t−1
[(
bt
b∗t
)βΨ1 (∆bt+1
∆b∗t+1
)βΨ2](1−βΨ0)
(28)
where bt =
Bt
Yt
is the debt-to-GDP ratio and b∗t is the target debt-to-GDP ratio, given
by the AR(2) process:
log b∗t − log b∗t−1 = µb + ρ1(log b∗t−1 − log b∗t−2)− ρ2 log b∗t−1 − εbt
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where εbt is a white noise shock representing a fiscal consolidation.
3
2.5 Closing the model
2.5.1 Monetary policy
There is a single independent monetary authority that sets the nominal interest rate
to target zero net inflation, subject to the ZLB:
R?t = Max
{
1, ρR?t−1 + (1− ρ) ρpip˜it
}
(29)
where p˜it is the sum of national consumer inflations, weighted by population sizes,
npit + (1− n) pi?t . For the Home, consumer inflation is defined as:
pih,t
pit
=
ph,t
ph,t−1
(30)
With fixed nominal exchange rates, the real exchange rate equals the ratio of con-
sumer prices:
et
et−1
=
pi?t
pit
(31)
Finally, and to render the model stationary, we introduce a risk premium charged
to Home households depending on the relative size of net-foreign-liabilities to total
output:
rf,t = r
?
t exp
{
Γτ¯ et
bf,t+1
rgdpt
}
(32)
where Γ is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the liabilities.
3Notice that public wage cuts reduce the wage bill in the public sector in the same period, while
public vacancy cuts reduce it with a lag from next period.
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2.5.2 Resource constraint
The non-tradeable domestic final good is sold for consumption and for investment:
yt = ct + i
p
t + κυ
p
t + κυ
g
t (33)
and, following, Gomes (2015a), total output is defined as private output plus the
wage bill:
rgdpt = px,ty
p
t + w
g
tn
g
t (34)
Aggregating the budget constraint of households using the market clearing condi-
tions, the budget constraint of the government, and aggregate profits Vt =
´
i
ΠR (i) di,
we obtain the law of motion for net foreign assets, which is given by:
et (rf,t−1bf,t − bf,t+1) = nxt (35)
and where nxt are net exports defined as:
nxt = ph,ty
?
h,t − pf,tτyf,t (36)
2.5.3 Wage bargaining
Private sector wages are determined by ex post (after matching) Nash bargaining.
Workers and firms split rents and the part of the surplus they receive depends on
their bargaining power. If we denote by ϑ ∈ (0, 1) the firms’ bargaining power, the
Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wpt
{
(1− ϑ) lnV Hnpt + ϑ lnV Fnpt
}
20
where V Hnpt and V
F
npt have been defined above. The optimization problem leads to the
following solution for wpt :
wpt xt = (1− ϑ)px,t(1− φ)
ypt
npt
+
ϑ
(1− τn)λc,tΦl
ϕ
t (37)
Hence, the equilibrium wage is a weighted average of the marginal product of em-
ployment and the disutility from labour, with the weights given by the firm and
household’s bargaining power respectively.4
2.6 Model Solution and Calibration
We solve the model by linearising the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic
steady state in which all prices are flexible, the price of the private good is normalized
to unity, and inflation is zero. When considering the ZLB, which is a non-linear
constraint, we use the Occbin toolkit provided by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015).
Table 1 shows some of the key parameters and steady-state values targeted in
our calibration. Full details of the calibration strategy are provided in the online
appendix.
3 Results
We consider a shock which drives the debt-to-GDP ratio target around 2pp below
its steady state after 10 quarters. We simulate the response to this shock under the
two alternative policy instruments, υg and wg. We then consider the same shock in
a low inflation environment. Following the literature, this environment is induced by
assuming a positive shock to the household’s discount rate, β, which causes inflation
to fall, driving the nominal interest rate to its lower bound.5
4See the online appendix for the full derivation.
5We assume that the shock decays with auto-regressive parameter 0.5.
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Table 1: Calibration of Parameters and Steady-State Values
Parameter/Variable Description Value
Preferences:
β Household discount factor 0.99
η Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1
ϕ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labour 4
Labour Market:
(1− l) Labour force participation 65%
u/(1−l) Unemployment rate 10%
ng/n Share of public employment 18%
κ/wp Vacancy costs as a share of wages 4.5%
Production:
ν Productivity of public good 0.05
φ, µ Share of capital in production 0.36
kg/kp Public-private capital ratio 0.31
χ Price-stickiness 0.75
Policy Parameters:
ρpi Taylor-rule inflation targeting parameter 2.5
ρ1, ρ2 Debt-target law of motion 0.85, 0.0001
b Steady-state debt-to-GDP ratios 50%
To further investigate the results, we also show the role of the different mechnisms
of the model. Firstly, with respect to the assumptions about monetary and fiscal
policy, we consider the role of the consolidation shock, the speed of adjustment during
consolidation and the strength of the monetary policy response. Finally, we carry out
sensitivity analysis with respect to some of the parameters in the model, looking in
particular at the productivity of the public good, the size of investment adjustment
costs and the elasticity of labour supply.
3.1 Consolidation in Normal Times
In this section we analyse the role of consolidation in normal times, when the economy
is not subject to deflationary shocks.
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3.1.1 Quantity-based Measures: Public Vacancy Cuts
We start by analyzing the effects of fiscal consolidation when vacancy cuts are as-
sumed to be the fiscal policy instrument for achieving the lower debt target. Results
from this exercise are presented in Figure 5. We see that the cut in public vacancies
causes a fall in public employment, and hence both the public wage bill and public
output fall with a lag. Eventually, some of the jobseekers leaving the public sector
move sluggishly towards the private sector, causing a rise in private employment.
At the same time, the reduction in expenditure on the public wage bill creates a
positive wealth effect for the household, causing a rise in private consumption. This,
plus the fall in private wages, crowds out private investment and leads to a reduction
in private capital. Yet, private output increases due to the availability of cheaper
labour, despite the fall in public output, which also serves as an input in private
production. The unemployment rate increases persistently due to the fall in public
employment and the increase in the labour force participation rate. Finally, despite
the boost to private output, real GDP falls after the consolidation as a result of the
fall in the public wage bill.
3.1.2 Price-based Measures: Public Wage Cuts
Figure 6 depicts the case in which fiscal consolidation is achieved through cuts in
the public wage. The public wage cut causes a significant fall in the fraction of
jobseekers in the public sector. As before, this causes a movement of jobseekers
towards the private sector, and boosts private employment. In the case of wage
cuts, the subsequent decrease of the private wage reduces marginal costs of firms
in the private sector and this increases the demand for labour and boosts private
employment. Due to the fall in public wages and the increase in demand in the
private sector, unemployed shift their supply of labour towards the private sector.
Hence, public employment is also decreasing, as in the case of vacancy cuts, but
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for different reasons. Differently from before, the adjustment is less sluggish, as
labour force participation also rises, and private wages are reduced soon after the
public wage cut. As a result, private vacancies increase on impact and this leads to
increases in both private employment and capital. Despite the fall in income, we see
that again the consolidation causes a positive wealth effect for the household, raising
consumption and investment. Hence, despite the fall in public output, we again see
a rise in private output. It is also important to note that the consolidation is much
more successful in the case of public wage cuts, with the debt-to-GDP ratio falling
to its new target after 12 quarters. Total GDP falls also in the case of public wage
cuts but less persistently relative to the case of vacancy cuts.
Hence, in line with Bradley et al. (2015), we find that in normal times cuts in the
public wage bill reduce public sector employment and increase hiring in the private
sector. However, our results indicate that the effects on aggregate unemployment are
different for the two instruments considered: in the case of public wage cuts (price-
based measure) the increase in private-sector employment prevails and we observe a
fall in the unemployment rate, while in the case of public vacancy cuts (quantity-
based measure) the fall in public employment is such that leads to an increase in the
unemployment rate.
3.2 Consolidation in a Low Inflation Environment
In this section we analyse how our conclusions about fiscal consolidation through
public wage bill cuts change when the monetary union operates in a low inflation
environment.
3.2.1 Quantity-based Measures: Public Vacancy Cuts
Figure 7 shows the impulse response functions when public vacancies are the active
consolidation instrument in a low inflation environment. For comparabilty purposes,
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the blue solid line depicts the baseline simulations in response to the fiscal consoli-
dation shock only. First, notice that the effects of the consolidation shock alone are
very small compared to the effects of the discount rate shock. The red line depicts
the responses in a low inflation environment induced by the shock to the household’s
discount rate, when imposing the ZLB constraint. Here we see that the nominal
and the real interest rates fall sharply. Yet, the gross nominal rate reaches its lower
bound and cannot fall more than 1% in deviations from its steady state value since
in that case it hits the ZLB. With the negative demand shock, we observe a fall in
private consumption and an increase in private investment compared to the baseline
case. The latter leads to increases in private capital. However, despite the rise in
capital, the demand contraction leads to a fall in private labour demand and, hence,
private employment. The negative wealth effect is so strong that agents increase
further their participation, leading to a considerable increase in unemployment. The
simultaneous contraction in the private and the public sector leads to a rise in public
debt despite the consolidation. This means that public vacancies need to fall by
much more than the baseline case, reducing public employment and output by more.
This further reinforces the fall in private output and makes consolidation difficult to
achieve.
In contrast, in the absence of a ZLB constraint, depicted by the green dashed
lines, the economic effects of the shock would be much more moderate. In such a
case, since the nominal rate can sufficiently offset the fall in inflation, the real rate
falls more and mitigates the contraction in the private sector, actually expanding
private investment. In this scenario, in fact, the debt-to-GDP target is reached
almost immediately due to the significant fall in the interest rate and after the first
two periods the consolidation is reversed.6
6In experiments we do not present here for economy of space we show that without the consol-
idation shock, this economy would suffer very little from the discount shock and if anything the
consolidation intensifies the effects of the shock by crowding out private employment since it is
reversed.
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3.2.2 Price-based Measures: Public Wage Cuts
Figure 8 plots impulse responses for the case of public wage cuts. Again, the blue
continuous lines depict the baseline responses presented in subsection 3.1.2, red lines
show responses when the ZLB constraint is binding and the economy is hit by a
discount rate shock and the green lines show the unrestricted responses in the pres-
ence of the deflationary shock. Responses look very similar with the responses of the
vacancy cut case: When the interest rate is not bounded by the zero constraint, its
fall allows the government to achieve consolidation very fast and actually after two
periods consolidation is reversed, leading to increases in public wages. This shifts
labour supply towards the public sector, reducing employment in the private sector
and contracting private output despite the surge in private investment induced by
the lower value of the real rate. On the other hand, public output expands so much
that total real GDP increases after the first 4 quarters.7
Moving to the more interesting case of the equilibrium in which the ZLB con-
straint is imposed, we see that the fall in the nominal interest rate is not enough
to bring inflation back to equilibrium. The fall in the real rate expands investment
more than in the baseline case, but consumption contracts significantly due to the
demand shock. Firms can hire workers for a lower wage as in the benchmark case,
but demand is contracted. Private vacancies do not increase that much on impact,
leading to a fall in private employment and tax revenues, making the consolidation
much more difficult to achieve in this environment.
To sum up, the fall in private output induced by the negative effects of the
deflationary shock makes it more difficult for the government to consolidate debt
and attenuates the positive effects of the consolidation in normal times. In this case,
public wage cuts lead to a rise in unemployment for several periods, and have a similar
7Again, in experiments we do not present here for economy of space we demonstrate that the
economy can recover even faster from the deflationary shock in the absence of the consolidation
shock.
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negative effect on private output, hence they are no longer obviously preferable to
vacancy cuts.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis I: Fiscal and Monetary Policy
3.3.1 The Role of the Consolidation Shock
To understand better how consolidation affects the economy at the ZLB in this
subsection we analyse the dynamics of the economy at the ZLB when consolidation
is imposed (continuous lines) and when it is not (crossed lines) in Figures 9 and 10
for vacancy cuts and wage cuts, respectively.
For the case of vacancy cuts, the presence or not of fiscal consolidation when a
deflationary shock hits the economy makes very little difference. The deflationary
shock increases debt and according to the debt rule specified in Equation (28), the
public vacancies react even without the consolidation shock. Yet, apart from the
obvious effects the consolidation has on public vacancies and the public wage bill
and its immediate effect on public employment and output, the presence or not of a
consolidation shock changes very little the dynamics of the private sector. Private
employment seems to react a bit faster in the presence of a consolidation shock, but
this differentiated response does not seem to affect significantly the dynamics of the
private-sector economy.
The picture is, however, different when we look at public wage cuts in Figure 10.
The consolidation in this case does help the faster recovery of the private sector by
leading to stronger positive reactions of investment and private employment and in-
creases in private vacancies. As a result, private output falls less under this scenario,
making the recovery of the economy following the combined shocks faster.
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3.3.2 The Speed of Adjustment during Consolidation
In Figures 11 and 12 we examine how our conclusions would change if we considered
a faster speed of adjustment for the fiscal consolidations in the case of vacancy
cuts and wage cuts, respectively. Notice that because of difficulties in satisfying
the stability criteria in the model we cannot freely change the parameters of debt
adjustments for the two instruments (especially for vacancy cuts). Nonetheless, faster
debt adjustment seems to imply that for both fiscal instruments the recovery of the
private sector is somewhat faster. Since the debt consolidation shocks can undo the
negative effects of the deflationary shock in the economy, requiring the instruments
to adjust faster implies a stronger reaction of private employment, and hence smaller
detrimental effects of the deflationary shock on private output. This of course comes
at the cost of a higher public output and wage bill adjustment that results in a more
negative response of real GDP.
3.3.3 The Strength of Monetary Policy
In Figures 13 and 14 we examine the sensitivity of our results to the conduct of
monetary policy at the union level. The circled lines depict responses of the econ-
omy when we assume a more lax monetary policy (ρpi=1,1), while continuous lines
depict responses in our baseline model. Responses for the two instruments differ
significantly in this case. For price-based measures (public wage cuts) implementing
debt consolidation when the ZLB constraint is binding in such a monetary policy
environment implies that the economy will suffer from deflation and lower demand
for a longer period. As a result, the consolidation has to be more pronounced, lead-
ing to significant falls in both private output and total GDP. On the other hand, in
the case of quantity-based measures (vacancy cuts) deflation does not persist and
as a result the differences between the case of stricter or more lax monetary policy
are minimal. This is a crucial difference between the two consolidation instruments:
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wage cuts prolong the deflationary periods, while vacancy cuts as a quantity-based
measure have little effects on inflation and their efficacy is independent of the stance
of monetary policy.
3.3.4 Independent Monetary Policy
Finally, in Figures 15 and 16 we compare the responses of the economy to a fiscal
consolidation when the ZLB binds after a discount factor shock in the case of inde-
pendent monetary policy (dashed lines), using a closed economy setup, and common
monetary policy, using the previous monetary union setup (continues lines). Confirm-
ing the results of Erceg and Linde (2013) about spending cuts, a fiscal consolidation
in a monetary union is much more detrimental relative to the case of independent
monetary policy in a closed economy. This is evident from the responses of private
output, real GDP and the unemployment rate both for public vacancy cuts and
public wage cuts. These effects are mainly driven by the fact that inflation falls by
more in the case of a monetary union and, as a result, the real interest rate falls
and private investment increases by much less than in the case of a closed economy.
Interestingly, when we compare the closed and open economy versions of our base-
line model (without the discount factor shock), we can see in Figures 17 and 18 that
the effects of public vacancy cuts are more adverse, at least for five quarters, with
independent monetary policy (closed economy).
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis II: Deep Parameters
Our results might be sensitive not only to the policy specification we adopt for the
fiscal and monetary authority, but also to some assumptions about deep parameters
in the model. In this section we examine some of them that we find are crucial for
our analysis.
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3.4.1 The Productivity of Public Output
The results we present are, of course, very sensitive to the assumed value for the
productivity of the public good (ν), as this is crucial in determining the effects of
cuts in public wages or vacancies even in the baseline model when the ZLB does not
bind. Despite the positive effects of the consolidation on private employment and
capital, we have seen that both instruments lead to a fall in public output, and this
leads to a direct negative effect in the private production function. The balance of
these effects, and hence the effect of the consolidation on private output, depends on
the productivity of the public good.
Given the importance of the parameter ν, it is only natural to ask how the
productivity of the public output affects our conclusions about the effects of fiscal
consolidation in the ZLB. Figure 19 and 20 depict the responses of the baseline model
with continuous lines, while circled lines represent the model economy responses when
we assume a higher productivity of the public good in private production (we set ν=
0.15 in this experiment). As it is clear from the results, making the public sector
more productive implies a need for stronger fiscal consolidation after the discount
factor shock, and a larger and more persistent fall in private output.
3.4.2 Investment Adjustment Costs
Investment adjustment costs are crucial determinants of the reaction of private capi-
tal to the consolidation shock, in particular in the presence of the demand shock. As
we saw, the negative demand shock, by increasing the desire to save, increases pri-
vate investment, which boosts private output and aids the consolidation effort. This
is clearly indicated in Figures 21 and 22 where we plot the responses of the economy
when we increase the adjustment cost parameter from 0.5 to 3. With higher adjust-
ment costs, investment and hence private capital do not rise as much, private output
falls more, and the debt-to-GDP rises more.
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3.4.3 Endogenous Labour Force Participation
The assumption of labour force participation could also affect our results since, as
we have seen in the baseline analysis, agents adjust their participation decision when
they feel the possibility of finding a job increases or when they suffer from a negative
wealth effect. In turn, the change in participation affects labour supply and thus
the equilibrium wage and production levels. In Figures 23 and 24 we compare the
responses of the model economy we shut the participation margin (circled lines) with
the baseline responses (continuous lines) for vacancy and wage cuts, respectively.
When agents are not allowed to adjust their participation, private vacancies react
less to the shock relative to the case of endogenous participation and, as a result,
private employment reacts more negatively to the shock, reducing the reaction of
private output and making it more difficult for the fiscal authorities to achieve the
debt target.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have set up a DSGE model of a monetary union with search
and matching frictions, nominal rigidities, and public employment. This rich model
allows us to study non-trivial reallocation of agents in and out of the labour force,
and between the public and private sector. In the baseline case, a fiscal consolidation
through a cut in public wages is able to reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio faster
than public vacancy costs, although both have similar effects on private output and
lead to a reduction in public employment and an increase in private-sector hirings.
However, in the case of public wage cuts the increase in private-sector employment
prevails, leading to a fall in the unemployment rate, while in the case of public
vacancy cuts the fall in public employment is such that raises the unemployment rate.
Hence, public wage cuts are a preferable consolidation strategy to public vacancy cuts
31
in normal times.
In a low inflation environment a much larger cut in the public wage bill is required
to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to the desired level. The rise in the real interest rate
when the ZLB constraint is binding leads to a rise in public debt and, as a result,
makes consolidation more costly. The fall in demand creates a drag on the private
sector, meaning that the consolidation in this environment has large negative effects.
These negative effects are mitigated when monetary policy is conducted indepen-
dently (in a closed economy setup). The differences between the two instruments
appear less pronounced in a low inflation environment; yet public wage cuts lead to
a reduction in the long-run unemployment rate, while public vacancy cuts induce a
persistent rise in unemployment.
As our sensitivity analysis showed, our model and parameter assumptions are
important for determining the results. Given our model structure we could not
extend our sensitivity analysis to all possible assumptions we have adopted. We
know, for example, that the reallocation of workers from the public to the private
sector is key for our results, as is the assumption of flexible wages. In future versions
of this paper we plan to extend our sensitivity analysis to these and other primitives
of our model.
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